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COMMENTS
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS--CHECK GIVEN AS PART PAYMENT
UNDER ORAL CONTRACT TO PURCHASE LAND
Sturgis v. Meadors, 266 SJV.2d 81 (Ark. 1954)
Defendant vendee entered into an oral contract to purchase plain-
tiffs' farm and delivered a check for $1,000 as payment for earnest
money, but a few days thereafter stopped payment on the check. The
vendors, alleging that they were ready, willing and able to convey
the land to the vendee in accordance with the contract, sued to recover
the amount of the check. Proof at the trial disclosed that plaintiffs
were unable at that time to convey a marketable title to defendant as
provided in the oral agreement. The Arkansas Supreme Court, affirm-
ing the trial court's decision for the plaintiffs, held that the failure
to comply with the statute of frauds in making the contract to convey
land did not prevent the vendors from recovering the amount of the"
check and that defendant, by stopping payment on the check, rendered
useless any further efforts by the plaintiffs to perfect their title1
The general rule is that a vendor can recover the amount of a
negotiable instrument given him as part payment for the purchase
of land even though the vendee pleads that the promise to sell fails
to comply with the applicable statute of frauds, provided that the
vendor is ready, willing and able to perform as he promised. In
states having statutes providing that no action shall be brought upon
a parol contract for the sale of land,3 the courts have sustained the
vendor's recovery on: the ground that the action is based upon the
negotiable instrument rather than upon the parol agreement 4 The
more appropriate defense to such an action on a negotiable instrument
is failure or lack of consideration rather than non-compliance with
the statute of frauds.5 But a promise to convey land, even though it is
not enforceable, is sufficient consideration 6 for a negotiable instru-
ment and, so long as the vendor is ready and willing to. perform in
1. Sturgis v. Meadors, 266 S.W.2d 81 (Ark. 1954).
2. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 286 (1950). See Note, 132 A.L.R. 1486 (1941).
3. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-101 (Burns 1949); KY. REV. STAT. § 371.010
(1953); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3995 (1945).
4. Schierman v. Beckett, 88 Ind. 52 (1882); Edelin v. Clarkson's Executors,
42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 31 (1842); Crutchfield v. Donathon, 49 Tex. 691 (1878).
But cf. Reese v. Bailey, 199 Ky. 504, 251 S.W. 633 (1923).
5. Negotiable instruments are deemed prima facie to have been issued for a
valuable consideration. Sce NrCOTIABLE 1NSTRU1ZNTS LAW § 24. Absence or
failure of consideration is a dfense against any person not a holder in due
course. See NEGOd;IABLE INSTUMENTS LAW § 28.
6. RESTATEIENT, CONTP-%CTS § 84, comment e (1932).
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accordance with the parol agreement, the consideration for the nego-
tiable instrument has not failed.'
In states where the -statute of frauds provides that parol contracts
to sell land are void,8 the vendor is allowed to recover on the theory
that the statute's requirement that a promise to convey land be in
writing is for the protection of the vendor only.9 Failure to comply
with this requirement does not make the parol agreement void even
though the statute so provides, but merely voidable at the election of
the vendor. 0 If the vendor chooses to perform his parol promise to
convey land, there is sufficient consideration for the negotiable instru-
ment to enable him to collect its proceeds from the defaulting buyer.21
Another rationale appearing in the cases12 that have granted recov-
ery to the vendor has been based on an allusion to cases involving a
converse situation wherein the vendee, who has given cash as earnest
money to the vendor, attempts to recover the earnest money after de-
ciding not to perform the parol agreement to purchase land. Recovery
in such a situation is denied to the vendee by the majority of courts' s
if the vendor is able and willing to perform his promise to convey.
Statutes of fraud preventing maintenance of an action on a parol con-
tract to c6nvey land,14 or providing that such contracts are voidi5 or in-
valid, 8 are again interpreted as b~ing for the protection of the vendor
only. The -vendee, accordingly, cannot take advantage of the'statute by
seeking to set aside the parol agreement and recover his partial pay-
ment if the vendor has decided not to avail himself of the statute's
protection and is ready, willing and able to perform the oral agree-
ment." Inasmuch as these courts will deny the vendee recovery of
7. 2 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 286 (1950).
8. See, e.g., COLO. RaV. STAT. § 59L1-8 (1953); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.05(West 1947). See also 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 284, n.72 (1950).
9. Garbarino v. Union Savings '& Loan Ass'n, 107 Colo. 140, 109 P.2d 638(1941) ; Phelan v. Carey, 222 Minn. 1, 23 N.W.2d 10 (1946).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. 30 MINN. L. Ray. 647 (1946).
12. Fletcher v. Lake, 121 Me. 474, 118 Ati. 321 (1922); McGowen v. West,
7 Mo. 569 (1842); Fleischman v. Plock, 19 Misc. 649, 44 N.Y. Supp. 413 (Sup.
Ct. 1897); see cases cited in note 9 supra.
13. See Note, 169 A.L.R. 187 (1947).
14. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 38-101 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 59, § 2(1951); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-101 (Burns 1949); ME. REV. STAT. C. 119, § 1(1954); Mo. REv. STAT. § 432.010 (1949); VT. REV. STAT. § 1716 (1947).
15. See note 8 supra. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 259; ORE. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 2-909 (1940).
16. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 74-203 (1947); OKLA. STAr. ANN. tit.
15, § 136 (1937). See also 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 284 n.73 (1950).
17. Veneble v. Brown, 31 Ark. 564 (1876); Colorado Lumber, Land & Improve-
ment Co. v. Dustin, 38 Colo. 398, 87 Pac. 1142 (1906); Mitchell v. McNab, 1 II11
App. 297 (1878); Day v. Wilson, 83 Ind. 463 (1882); Gammon v. Butler, 48 Me.
344 (1861); Sennett v. Shehan, 27 Minn. 328, 7 N.W. 266 (1880); Chamberlain
v. Ft. Smith Lumber Co., 179 S.W. 740 (-Mo. App. 1915); Perkins v. Allnut, 47
Mont. 13, 130 Pac. 1 (1913); Keystone Hardware Corp. v. Tague, 246 N.Y. 79;
158 N.E. 27 (1927); Schechinger v. Gault, 35 Okla. 416, 130 Pac. 305 (1913);
Barton v. Simmons, 129 Ore. 457, 278 Pac. 83 (1929); Shaw v. Shaw, 6 Vt. 66(1834).
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his cash down payment if the vendor is willing to perform, by analogy,
the vendor should be able to recover on an earnest money check if he is
willing to perform. This rationale is the one relied on by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in the principal case. "
Although the plaintiffs in the principal case were willing to perform
their promise to convey the land to the vendee, they were unable and
certainly not ready to perform at the time of trial as proof disclosed
they could not at that time convey a marketable title to the defendant
as required by the parol agreement.' 9 Inability or unwillingness of a
promisor to perform a promise unenforceable against him for lack
of compliance with the statute of frauds is such a failure of consider-
ation as will defeat his action against the promisee upon a negotiable
instrument given pursuant to the oral agreement.20 But the proof also
disclosed that defendant stopped payment on the earnest money check
a few days after drawing it and did not tender the remainder of the
purchase price or demand performance by the vendor, thus manifest-
ing his intent to repudiate the oral agreement to purchase plaintiffs'
land. Defendant's repudiation of the parol agreement made his duty
to pay the negotiable instrument independent of the plaintiffs' duty
to convey a marketable title, at least in the absence of evidence that
plaintiffs could not or would not make marketable title, and rendered
useless further efforts by the plaintiffs to perfect their title.=
The court in the principal case clearly is correct in adopting the
prevailing rule that a vendor can collect the proceeds of a negotiable
instrument given as partial payment for land according to the terms
of a parol agreement which is unenforceable against the vendor for
failure to comply with the statute of frauds, provided that the vendor
is ready, willing and able to perform as he promised. The extension
of this rule to cover the instant situation wherein the vendors were
unable and not ready to perform at the date of trial is also warranted
in that the vendee's repudiation of the parol agreement by stopping
payment on the check excused the vendors from further performance.
18. Sturgis v. Meadors, 266 S.W.2d 81 (Ark. 1954).
19. Brief for Appellants, pp. 17, 19, 50-53, Sturgis v. Meadors, 266 S.W.2d
81 (Ark. 1954).
20. Hamburg Bank v. Ahrens, 118 Ark. 548, 177 S.W. 14 (1915); 2 Conm,
CONTRACTS § 286 (1950).
21. Lambright v. Heck, 86 Ohio App. 456, 93 N.E.2d 45 (1949); RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTs § 306 (1932).
Washington University Open Scholarship
